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1 Introduction  
It is widely acknowledged that foreign direct investment (FDI) is associated with new 
technologies and organisational know-how which contribute to higher aggregate productivity in 
host countries.1 While evidence on positive spillovers from foreign affiliates to domestic firms is 
mixed,2 governments around the world are competing to attract FDI projects in order to boost 
productivity and competitiveness. In addition, FDI projects, particularly greenfield investments, 
are linked to net job creation. When deciding where to locate, multinational firms consider a 
range of factors such as production costs, market size, market potential and sourcing inputs 
including human capital and technology. 3  Among these factors corporate taxation could be 
directly influenced by policy and it is indeed widely used across countries to increase their 
attractiveness to FDI.    
A large literature has found that lower corporate tax rates increase the attractiveness of countries 
and regions to FDI particularly in small and peripheral countries which could not benefit from 
other locational characteristics such as market size and market access. 4 Most of the existing 
studies are based on models using a representative location-seeking investing firm assuming a 
homogeneous investment behaviour across investing firms. However, it is very likely that 
investors from different home countries and in different sectors would perceive the benefits of 
the set of possible locations differently. Moreover, most empirical analyses of the location choice 
of FDI projects have assumed that each location option is different from all the other alternative 
locations.5  This assumption is unrealistic given very likely similarities of locations particularly in 
the case of those sharing a common history, geography and institutional setting.     
To fill this gap, this paper examines the impact of the effective average corporate tax rates 
(EATRs) and other factors on the attractiveness of EU countries to foreign direct investment. In 
comparison to previous analyses on the location choice of multinational activity in the EU, we 
use an improved empirical methodology to account for more flexible substitution patterns 
among alternative locations by considering groups of countries with similar characteristics as 
location alternatives. In addition, we account for the heterogeneity of investors’ behaviour by 
considering intra-EU investments and investments from outside the EU. Furthermore, we 
identify and quantify similarities and differences with respect to the effects of corporate taxation 
and the effects of other factors on the location choice of foreign affiliates in manufacturing and 
services.  
                                                          
1 A large empirical literature has found that foreign affiliates are more productive than domestic firms. A 
recent discussion of the international empirical evidence is provided among others by Schiffbauer et al. 
(2017).     
2 Gӧrg and Strobl (2001) and Meyer and Sinani (2009) review the international evidence on productivity 
spillovers from foreign affiliates to domestic firms.  
3 Recent reviews of the evidence on determinants of the location choice of foreign affiliates include 
among others Fontagné and Mayer (2005), Siedschlag et al. (2013a, 2013b), Lawless et al. (2014), and 
Davies et al. (2016a).    
4 The international evidence has been reviewed by de Mooij and Edverdeen (2003, 2008).  
5 In terms of empirical methodology, this assumption is known as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA).   
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Consistent with previous research results, the evidence in this paper indicates that on average, 
other things equal, lower corporate effective average tax rates increase the attractiveness of EU 
countries to FDI. However, other factors matter too and some of these are relatively more 
important for the attractiveness of the EU countries to FDI than lower corporate tax rates. 
When distinguishing between intra-EU FDI projects and those originating from outside the EU, 
our estimates show that the location choice of FDI projects by investors from outside the EU is 
highly sensitive to the EATRs in host countries while, the EATR does not seem to matter for 
the location choice of intra-EU FDI projects.      
Our research also finds that investors respond differently to corporate taxation depending on 
whether they invest in manufacturing or services. While the EATR does not appear to affect 
significantly the location choice of FDI in manufacturing, higher EATRs reduce the 
attractiveness of EU countries to FDI in services.   
Taken together, our results indicate that while intra-EU investors seem to be mainly motivated 
by efficiency seeking, investors from outside the EU are seeking access to the EU Single Market. 
Furthermore, while access to the EU Single Market does not seem to matter for FDI in 
manufacturing, it matters for FDI in services.  
In terms of the sensitivity of the attractiveness of EU countries to changes in country-specific 
EATRs, our estimates indicate that the most sensitive are Southern European countries (Malta, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain) and the least sensitive are Germany and the UK. This pattern is similar 
in the case of investments in manufacturing and services while a different pattern emerges in the 
case of investments from outside the EU. Ireland appears to be the most sensitive to changes in 
its EATR in terms of FDI from outside the EU, followed by Malta, Norway, Luxembourg, and 
Finland. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical methodology. 
Next, Section 3 describes the data set and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Empirical Methodology 
Location choices by multinational firms have been typically analysed using a random utility 
maximization framework following McFadden (1974).6 In this modelling set up, the investor 
considers the set of alternative locations, and chooses the location with the highest profitability 
among competing alternatives. Each location alternative’s profitability is a function of the 
location’s characteristics. It is assumed that locational characteristics affect the profitability of all 
investors symmetrically.   
Suppose that there are N investors, i=1,...N  considering j=1, ...J alternative locations. Firm i 
considers the investment profitability in each location ijπ which is a function of  observable 
6 Recent reviews of this modelling framework include among others Schmidheiny and Brϋlhart (2011), 
Siedschlag et al. (2013a, 2013b), and Lawless et al. (2014).  
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location characteristics jX  and a stochastic term of unobservable profit specific to each firm and 
location ijµ   
ijjij X µβπ +=             (1) 
β is a vector of coefficients related to the corresponding vector of observable location 
characteristics jX .  
Following McFadden (1974), if, and only if, ijµ follows an extreme-value type 1 distribution and 
is independent and identically distributed across all investors i and alternative locations j, the 
probability that location j is chosen by firm i is given by:  
∑
=
i
X
X
j i
j
e
eP β
β
                                          (2) 
where .1=∑ j jP   
Given the assumption that location characteristics affect all investors symmetrically, the location 
probability jP quantifies the share of firms choosing to invest in location j.  
The assumption about the distribution of stochastic terms ijµ implies a statistical property 
known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Under this assumption, the parameters 
β can be estimated by a conditional logit model (CLM).  
The IIA property implies that the total number of investments is fixed and that changes in the 
location characteristics affect only the distribution of investments across all location alternatives. 
This means that if a location becomes more attractive and attracts one additional investment, this 
will be at the expense of another location.     
While the CLM is easy to estimate, because of the restrictive substitution patterns discussed 
above, the estimated locations’ attractiveness to foreign direct investment using this empirical 
framework are likely to be less realistic. In reality, location alternatives are not perfectly 
independent of each other. Indeed, location alternatives are likely to share unobserved 
characteristics such as similar cultural, historical, geographical, and institutional characteristics, 
which are relevant to corporate investment decisions.   
The nested logit model approach (NLM) improves on the CLM by considering groups of similar 
locations and thus allowing more flexible substitution patterns across alternative locations.7 This 
empirical approach follows McFadden (1984). In this empirical set up, corporate investors make 
their location choices in two steps:    
                                                          
7 The location choice of affiliates by multinational firms using nested logit models include among others 
Griffith and Devereux (1998), Crozet et al. (2004), Siedschlag et al. (2013a), and Davies et al. (2016b). 
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(1) the choice between groups of similar locations (nests);
(2) the location choice within nests.
The assumption in the NLM approach is that of independence between nests (unobserved 
locational characteristics are not correlated between nests) while it allows for non-negative 
correlation of unobserved locational characteristics within nests.  
Following McFadden (1984), the sum of utilities generated from alternatives in nest k  (known as 
the inclusive value of nest k , IVk) can be written as follows: 
ln exp( / )
k
k ih k
j n
IV U τ
∈
= ∑  (3) 
1k kτ ρ= − , where kρ  is the correlation of alternatives in nest k . The probability function of 
alternative h  in nest k  being chosen is the product of the probability of choosing nest k  (
Pr( )k ) and the conditional probability of choosing h  given that k  is chosen ( Pr( | )h k ).  
The probability function of alternative h  in nest k  being chosen can be expressed as follows: 
exp( / ) exp( )Pr( |1,..., ) Pr( | )Pr( )
exp( ) exp( )
h h h h
h k kK
U IVy h J h k k
IV IV
τ τ
τ
= = =
∑
 (4) 
A higher value of kτ  indicates a greater independence and so less correlation among alternative 
locations within the nest k. If the location alternatives within the nest are perfectly independent 
(perfectly dissimilar), kτ  = 1.  In this case a nested structure is not needed and the location 
probabilities could be estimated with the CLM. Low values of kτ  indicate high similarity among 
alternative locations within the nest and a higher degree of substitution among them.  kτ  = 0 
indicates perfect dependence (similarity) among alternative locations. 
Consistency of nested logit estimates with utility maximization could be tested (Kling and 
Herriges 1995; Herriges and Kling 1996; Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva 1987; Lee 1999). 
Values of kτ  between 0 and 1, indicate consistency of the nested structures with utility/profit 
maximization for all possible values of the explanatory variables.  kτ  > 1 indicates nested 
structures consistent with utility/profit maximization behaviour for some range of the 
explanatory variables but not for all values. kτ  < 0 indicates that the model is inconsistent with 
utility maximization. 
In this location choice nested logit modelling, in contrast to the conditional logit modelling, the 
expected total number of investments depends on the regressors and estimated parameters and it 
differs from the observed total number of firms. A change in a region’s locational attractiveness 
will affect the total number of firms summed across all alternative locations.8    
8 A more detailed discussion of the comparisons between the conditional and nested logit modelling 
frameworks is provided by Schmidheiny and Brϋlhart (2011).  
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2.1 Baseline model specification  
The baseline model specification we estimate is as follows: 







 ≠∀>
=
otherwise
kjif
y ikijij 0
,1 ππ
(5) 
The dependent variable ijy  is a binary variable equal to 1 if a new foreign affiliate i was 
established in country j over the period 2002-2013. ijπ   is the expected profit for firm i in 
country j.  Country j is chosen if ijπ  is larger than in any other alternative location k. Since ijπ is 
not known ex-ante by the multinational firm, the probability that country j is chosen by firm i 
depends on the likelihood that its profit will be maximized in country i depending on its 
characteristics.  
The expected profit ijπ is a function of observed locational characteristics jX and a random term 
of unobserved profit ijµ : 
ijjij X µβπ += (6) 
The variable of interest in this analysis is the effective average corporate tax rate. Corporate taxes 
impact on the cost of capital which in turn influences investment decisions. Existing evidence on 
the effect of corporate taxation on the location choice of foreign affiliates indicates that higher 
taxes reduce the likelihood of foreign direct investment.9  
In addition, we analyse the sensitivity of EU countries’ attractiveness to other factors which have 
been found to influence the location choice of foreign affiliates. These factors include:  
- demand factors such as market size and market access;
- production costs proxied by GDP per capita;
- technology level and innovation capacity proxied by the R&D expenditure intensity
- trade and investment costs proxied by the distance between the home and host countries;
- cultural and geographical proximity such as sharing a language, sharing borders;
Definitions and descriptions of the explanatory variables are given in Table A1 in the Appendix 
A.  
To identify nested structures, we group EU countries on the basis of similarities of institutional 
settings, as well as shared history and geographical and cultural proximity. Having tested 
alternative nested structures,10 we consider the following four groups of EU countries as location 
nests:   
9 Recent reviews of this evidence include among others de Mooij and Ederveen (2003), Barrios et al. 
(2012) and Lawless et al. (2014).   
10 Details of the composition of the alternative nested structures tested are given in Appendix B. The 
estimates for these nested structures were not consistent with the profit maximization requirements for all 
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- United Kingdom and Ireland;
- Core and Northern EU Group: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Norway;11
- Central and Eastern European EU Group: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia;
- Southern EU Group: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.
2.2 Heterogenous investors  
The above baseline model specification considers the behaviour of a representative location-
seeking investor. However, previous analyses on the location choice of multinational activity in 
the EU (Siedschlag 2013a, 2013b) have found that the relevance and importance of location 
characteristics are perceived differently by investors based in the EU and investors from outside 
the EU, particularly from the US. To account for this heterogeneity of investment behaviour, we 
analyse and compare the location decisions of investors with headquarters in the EU and those 
of investors with headquarters outside the EU.  
Further heterogeneity in the location decisions by multinational firms is likely to exist across 
sectors of economic activity (Siedschlag 2013a, 2013b; Lawless et al. 2014; Davies and Killeen 
forthcoming). We explore this heterogeneity by analysing separately the location decisions of 
new foreign affiliates in manufacturing and services.  
   3 Data and Summary Statistics 
This paper uses firm-level information provided by the Bureau van Djik’s Amadeus dataset for 
the period 2002-2013. We analyse 18,110 newly established foreign affiliates in EU countries 
identified on the basis of information on the companies’ ownership structure (percentages of 
ownership for global and domestic ultimate owners). The analysed sample is restricted to 
projects by global ultimate owners having a direct ownership of at least 50% of the affiliate.  
Table 1 shows the number of newly established foreign affiliates by year. The largest number has 
been recorded in 2007 (2,155 newly established foreign affiliates) and the smallest in 2013 (602 
newly established foreign affiliates).  
variables or had a lower estimated log likelihood (a test for model selection following Pollak and Wales 
2001). These results are available from the authors upon request.    
11 Norway is included as a location option together with EU countries given its membership in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) which makes it part of the EU Single Market. While Iceland and 
Lichtenstein are also members of the EEA, due to limited available data these two countries are not 
covered in this analysis. Given the very small size of these two countries, the results of this analysis are 
unlikely to be affected.   
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Table 1: Number of new foreign affiliates by year 
Year Number of new  foreign affiliates 
2002 996 
2003 1,051 
2004 1,257 
2005 1,495 
2006 1,983 
2007 2,155 
2008 1,891 
2009 1,653 
2010 1,848 
2011 1,752 
2012 1,427 
2013 602 
Total 18,110 
Source: Own calculations based on data extracted from the Amadeus data set provided by the Bureau van 
Dijk.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample of newly established foreign affiliates by host 
countries. The top five locations for FDI projects are Germany, the UK, Romania, Italy and the 
Netherlands accounting for 55% of the total number of FDI projects in the analysed sample.   
Table 3 shows the distribution of the FDI projects by country of origin. The top five countries 
of origin for the analysed FDI projects are Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United States, 
Germany and Spain, accounting for 56% of the FDI projects analysed.    
Table 4 summarises the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis. Definitions and 
descriptions of the explanatory variables are given in Table A1 in Appendix A.  
Data on the effective average tax rates (the main variable of interest) are taken from Spengel, et 
al. (2014). The rest of the data comes from various sources. To control for the market size of the 
host country, we use GDP, per-capita GDP, and market potential (constructed as the sum of 
other EU countries’ GDPs weighted by their distance to the country in question). In addition, to 
control for technological development we use the R&D expenditure (measured as public R&D 
expenditures relative to GDP). These variables come from World Development Indicators 
dataset (WDI) obtained from the World Bank.  
Finally, we control for the effects of three variables which have been widely used in the analysis 
of FDI based on gravity models: contiguity, common language, and distance (measured as the 
distance between most populated cities calculated using the great circle formula). These were 
obtained from the CEPII. 
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Table 2: Number of new foreign affiliates by host country 
Country Number of new foreign affiliates  Share of new foreign affiliates 
Germany  3,333 18.40 
United Kingdom 2,434 13.44 
Romania 1,546 8.54 
Italy  1,355 7.48 
Netherlands  1,264 6.98 
France  969 5.35 
Poland 956 5.28 
Czech Republic 869 4.8 
Austria 788 4.35 
Slovakia  786 4.34 
Estonia 667 3.68 
Portugal 462 2.55 
Belgium  346 1.91 
Ireland 321 1.77 
Denmark 308 1.7 
Finland 260 1.44 
Norway 250 1.38 
Hungary  234 1.29 
Estonia 194 1.07 
Croatia 191 1.05 
Latvia 173 0.96 
Luxembourg  134 0.74 
Bulgaria 94 0.52 
Slovenia 56 0.31 
Greece 44 0.24 
Malta 44 0.24 
Lithuania  32 0.18 
Total 18,110 100 
Source: Own calculations based on data extracted from the Amadeus data set provided by the Bureau van 
Dijk.  
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Table 3:  Number of new foreign affiliates by country of origin 
Origin 
Number of 
new foreign 
affiliates 
Share in 
total new  
FDI 
projects (%) 
Origin 
Number of 
new foreign 
affiliates  
Share in 
total new 
FDI 
projects (%) 
Switzerland 3,209 17.72 Cayman Islands 22 0.12 
Netherlands 2,274 12.56 Croatia 20 0.11 
United States 1,895 10.46 Malta 18 0.1 
Germany  1,712 9.45 Romania 17 0.09 
Spain  1,087 6 Virgin Islands, British 14 0.08 
Sweden 995 5.49 Chile 9 0.05 
Italy 932 5.15 Bosnia Herzegovina 8 0.04 
Belgium 707 3.9 Bangladesh 7 0.04 
United Kingdom 614 3.39 Mexico 7 0.04 
Japan 482 2.66 Russia 7 0.04 
Austria 451 2.49 Argentina 6 0.03 
France 423 2.34 Egypt 5 0.03 
Denmark 381 2.1 Indonesia 5 0.03 
Czech Republic 363 2 Moldova 5 0.03 
Hungary 291 1.61 Taiwan 5 0.03 
Finland 285 1.57 Venezuela 5 0.03 
Slovak Republic 182 1 Andorra 4 0.02 
Portugal 167 0.92 Sri Lanka 4 0.02 
Ireland 165 0.91 Nigeria 4 0.02 
Luxembourg 112 0.62 Gibraltar 3 0.02 
Israel 93 0.51 Pakistan 3 0.02 
Turkey 93 0.51 Saudi Arabia 3 0.02 
Norway 90 0.5 Angola 2 0.01 
Poland 86 0.47 Libya 2 0.01 
Lithuania 75 0.41 Marshall Islands 2 0.01 
China 72 0.4 Tunisia 2 0.01 
Canada 66 0.36 Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.01 
Greece 63 0.35 United Arab Emirates 1 0.01 
Slovenia 55 0.3 Bahamas  1 0.01 
Bermuda 48 0.27 Botswana 1 0.01 
India 48 0.27 Belarus 1 0.01 
Cyprus 46 0.25 Dominican Republic 1 0.01 
Estonia 45 0.25 Georgia 1 0.01 
Brazil  42 0.23 Ghana 1 0.01 
Latvia 42 0.23 Liberia 1 0.01 
Iceland 36 0.2 Macedonia 1 0.01 
Hong Kong 35 0.19 Mauritius 1 0.01 
South Africa 35 0.19 Malaysia 1 0.01 
Australia 28 0.15 Peru 1 0.01 
South Korea 28 0.15 Philippines 1 0.01 
Bulgaria 27 0.15 San Marino 1 0.01 
New Zealand 24 0.13 Suriname 1 0.01 
Source: Own calculations based on data extracted from the Amadeus data set provided by the Bureau van 
Dijk.  
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Table 4:  Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      EU market potential  18110 9.73 0.42 8.88 10.65 
Market size (GDP) 18110 13.32 1.48 8.70 14.96 
GDP per capita  18110 10.10 0.72 8.18 11.36 
Trade costs 18110 6.88 1.09 4.09 9.88 
Common language 18110 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Common border  18110 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
R&D expenditure intensity  18110 1.59 0.77 0.38 3.75 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 18110 3.11 2.58 0.14 14.06 
Effective average tax rate  18110 3.22 0.29 2.17 3.61 
Notes: Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. R&D 
expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common language, common border are dummy 
variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms.  
Source: Own calculations based on data extracted from the Amadeus data set provided by the Bureau van 
Dijk.  
 
Table 5 shows pair-wise correlations between the explanatory variables. Apart from the high 
correlation between R&D expenditure intensity and its squared term (0.965) the highest 
correlations are:  0.682 between GDP per capita and R&D expenditure; 0.596 between GDP per 
capita and the EATR; 0.587 between market size (GDP) and the EATR.  However, consistent 
with existing literature these values are acceptable in terms of possible multicollinearity concerns.    
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Table 5: Pair-wise correlations between the explanatory variables    
Explanatory variables  
EU 
Market 
potential  
Market 
size 
(GDP) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Trade 
costs  
Common 
language 
Common 
border  
R&D 
expenditure 
intensity  
R&D 
expenditure 
intensity 
squared 
Effective 
average 
tax rate 
(EATR)  
                    
EU market potential  1.000 
       
  
Market size (GDP) 0.225 1.000 
      
  
GDP per capita 0.458 0.514 1.000 
     
  
Trade costs  -0.332 -0.141 -0.176 1.000 
    
  
Common language 0.268 0.135 0.253 -0.233 1.000 
   
  
Common border  0.190 0.231 0.168 -0.428 0.520 1.000 
  
  
R&D expenditure intensity  0.323 0.428 0.682 -0.150 0.186 0.208 1.000 
 
  
R&D expenditure intensity 
squared 0.172 0.336 0.557 -0.097 0.141 0.172 0.965 1.000   
Effective average tax rate (EATR) 0.180 0.587 0.596 -0.111 0.184 0.196 0.426 0.342 1.000 
Notes: Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common 
language, common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms.  
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 All new FDI projects   
Table 6 shows the estimates from nested logit models of determinants of the location choice of 
new foreign affiliates in EU countries over the period 2002-2013. The first column reports the 
estimates from all investors, while columns 2 and 3 show the estimates for EU investors and 
non-EU investors, respectively.  
On average, other things equal, higher EATRs make EU countries less attractive as locations for 
FDI. While the location of FDI projects is highly sensitive to the EATR in host countries for 
non-EU investors, it appears not to matter for intra-EU investments.  
As shown in column 1, on average, the effect of corporate taxes on the attractiveness of EU 
countries to FDI appears to be less important than the effects of other location characteristics 
such as production costs, trade costs, market size, geographical and cultural proximity, 
technology level/innovation capacity, and EU market potential (the possibility to access the EU 
Single Market) Market.   
Location characteristics that increase countries’ attractiveness to FDI include: market size, access 
to the EU Single Market, speaking the same language, being neighbours. GDP per capita 
captures both production costs and skills. Location probabilities are negatively linked to GDP 
per capita, suggesting that on average, the attractiveness of low cost locations dominates the 
attractiveness of locations with high skills. Trade costs in the host country relative to home 
countries decrease the attractiveness of countries to new FDI.  
R&D expenditure intensity has a non-linear effect on the attractiveness of countries to FDI. 
While at low rates of R&D intensity the effect is negative, the effect turns positive once a 
threshold has been reached. This result indicates that EU countries with a higher technological 
gap are more attractive to FDI while high levels of technology and innovation increase the 
attractiveness to FDI.  
The dissimilarity parameters ( kτ ) indicate that Ireland and the United Kingdom and Southern 
European countries are perceived as being more similar as location alternatives compared with 
the other groups of EU countries considered as alternative location nests.  
The test for the IIA indicate that the alternative locations inside the considered groups of 
countries are not independent. This implies that the nested logit estimates are consistent with the 
IIA assumption. 12  
12 Estimates obtained with conditional logit models under the assumption that the IIA holds are reported 
in Appendix C. The coefficients for the EATR in all model specifications are negative and larger than 
those obtained with nested logit models. However, the LR test for IIA suggests that these results are 
biased.  
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Table 6: Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates in EU countries, 
2002-2013 
  All Investors  
 
EU Investors  
Non-EU 
Investors  
Explanatory variables   
 
  
     
EATR -0.217*** 0.048 -0.793*** 
 
(0.043) (0.056) (0.061) 
Market size (GDP) 0.362*** 0.373*** 0.390*** 
 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019) 
EU market potential  0.078*** -0.338*** 0.776*** 
 
(0.021) (0.033) (0.033) 
GDP per capita -0.509*** -0.613*** -0.045 
 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.047) 
Trade costs-distance to home country   -0.452*** -0.658*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.042) 
Common language 0.384*** 0.308*** 0.500*** 
 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.038) 
Common border  0.467*** 0.481*** 0.660*** 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.039) 
R&D expenditure intensity   -0.323*** -0.346*** -0.482*** 
 
(0.049) (0.066) (0.089) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.093*** 0.066*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.021) 
Dissimilarity parameters ( kτ ) 
 
  
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group 0.421*** 0.535*** 0.259*** 
 
(0.020) (0.032) (0.019) 
Core and Northern EU Group 0.638*** 0.735*** 0.469*** 
 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Central and Eastern EU Group 0.552*** 0.663*** 0.532*** 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.037) 
Southern EU Group  0.422*** 0.471*** 0.489*** 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023) 
  
  
Number of observations 436,846 274,341 162,505 
Log likelihood -47371 -30267 -16175 
LR test for IIA ( kτ =1) 
 
 χ2 (4) = 
858.17*** 
 
χ2 (4) = 
420.22***  
 
χ2 (4) = 
504.43***   
 
Notes: Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote 
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. The 
country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.       
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4.2 Intra-EU investment versus investment from outside the EU 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 6 reports results from separate regressions on determinants of the 
location choice of new foreign affiliates in EU countries by companies with headquarters in the 
EU and outside the EU. The evidence suggests that EU and non-EU investors perceive and 
value countries’ characteristics differently. While the EATR does not seem to affect the location 
choice on FDI projects by EU investors, lower EATR increase substantially the location 
likelihood of FDI by non-EU investors. Another different effect is in the case of production 
costs proxied by the GDP per capita. While low production costs increase substantially the 
attractiveness of countries to intra-EU investment, they do not matter for investors with 
headquarters outside the EU. Additional differences in investment behaviour are in relation to 
the effects of access to the EU Single Market and trade costs. While in the case of investors with 
headquarters outside the EU, the location probability increases significantly with distance to 
other the Single EU Market, from host countries, it decreases for EU– based investors. Also, 
investing in EU countries is more attractive the further away from the EU investors are. Taken 
together, these results suggest that, in the presence of trade costs, countries with a greater access 
to the EU Single Market are particularly attractive to investors with headquarters outside the EU.  
The results also suggest that while intra-EU investments are efficiency-seeking, FDI by investors 
from outside the EU are seeking access to the Single EU Market.    
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that with the exception of Southern EU countries, non-EU 
investors perceive countries within the considered nests as more similar than the EU investors. 
In particular, Ireland and the UK are seen as closer location substitutes by non-EU investors 
compared with EU investors. This result could be explained by the importance of foreign direct 
investment by US multinationals in both countries. For EU investors, the countries in the 
Southern EU group are seen as closer substitutes compared to alternative locations in the other 
EU groups.   
4.3 Differences across sectors 
The results shown in Table 7 indicate that foreign investors respond differently to corporate tax 
in manufacturing and services. While the EATR does not appear to affect significantly the 
attractiveness of EU countries to FDI in manufacturing, it reduces the probability of location of 
FDI in services. These results could be explained by the fact that scale matters for investment in 
manufacturing and larger countries which are more attractive to investment in manufacturing 
tend to have higher corporate tax rates.   
While on average, greater access to the EU Single Market increases the attractiveness of 
countries to FDI in services, it does not matter for the location choice of FDI in manufacturing.    
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that the locations within the four groups considered are 
more similar in the case of FDI in manufacturing in the cases on the Core and Northern EU 
group and the Southern European countries.  
  
16 
 
Table 7: Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates in EU countries, 
manufacturing and services, 2002-2013 
Explanatory variables All Investors 
 Manufacturing  Services 
   EATR  -0.187 -0.317*** 
 
(0.135) (0.050) 
Market size (GDP) 0.529*** 0.354*** 
 
(0.043) (0.013) 
EU market potential    0.111 0.143*** 
 
(0.079) (0.023) 
GDP per capita -0.899*** -0.396*** 
 
(0.071) (0.025) 
Trade costs- distance to home country  -0.448*** -0.431*** 
 
(0.052) (0.018) 
Common language 0.492*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.076) (0.024) 
Common border  0.480*** 0.533*** 
 
(0.065) (0.024) 
R&D expenditure intensity   -0.695*** -0.202*** 
 
(0.183) (0.056) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.220*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.044) (0.014) 
   Dissimilarity parameters  ( kτ ) 
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group  0.624*** 0.401*** 
 
(0.089) (0.022) 
Core and Northern EU group 0.614*** 0.641*** 
 
(0.039) (0.014) 
Central and Eastern EU Group  0.782*** 0.561*** 
 
(0.057) (0.020) 
Southern EU Group  0.412*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.044) (0.016) 
   Number of observations 47,193 338,284 
log likelihood -5105 -36569 
LR test for IIA ( kτ =1) 
 
χ2 (4) = 
116.25***   
 
χ2 (4) = 
663.90***   
 
Notes: Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote 
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages. Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. The 
country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.      
17 
 
Tables 8 and 9 explore heterogeneous effects in investment decisions across both investors and 
sectors.  Consistent with previous results discussed above, the estimates in Table 8 indicate the 
EATR does not seem to affect the location choices of intra-EU investments either in 
manufacturing or in services.  In contrast, lower EATR increase the attractiveness of countries to 
FDI by non-EU investors in both manufacturing and services. Larger market size increases the 
likelihood of investment in all analysed cases with larger effects in the case of FDI in 
manufacturing. The different relevance and importance of access to the EU Single Market 
appears again for EU and non-EU investors. While EU investors are less likely to invest in 
countries with a greater access to the Single EU Market (large core countries), greater access to 
the EU Single Market increases substantially the attractiveness to investment by non-EU 
investors in both manufacturing and services, with a larger effect in the case of FDI in services. 
We uncover additional heterogeneous effects with respect to the importance of production as 
well as trade costs. Lower production costs proxied by the GDP per capita attract intra-EU 
investments in both sectors, while in the case of non-EU investors, this attractiveness factor 
appears significant only for investment in manufacturing. Higher levels of GDP per capita 
increase the attractiveness of EU countries to foreign investment by non-EU investors in 
services. This result might be related to higher demand for services in countries with a higher 
level of development.  
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that the United Kingdom and Ireland are perceived to be 
more substitutable by non-EU investors investing in services.         
In the case of EU investors the countries within the considered EU groups are perceived to be 
more similar in the case of FDI in services with the exception of the Core and Northern group. 
Investors from non-EU countries perceive Ireland and the UK and the Central and Eastern EU 
countries to be more similar for FDI in services in comparison to FDI in manufacturing while 
Core and Northern countries and Southern countries are perceived to be more similar in the case 
of FDI in manufacturing.  
On the basis of the empirical results discussed above, Table 10 shows the estimated country-
specific conditional location probabilities. Consistent with existing literature, larger countries 
have the highest attractiveness to FDI projects. Among large EU countries, Germany has the 
highest location probability (15.8% of all FDI projects), followed by the UK, (11.6% of all FDI 
projects), France (10.6% of all FDI projects), Italy (8.8% of all FDI projects) and Poland (7.6%). 
The top five EU countries in terms of their attractiveness to investments from other EU 
countries are Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Poland. The ranking of the top five most 
attractive locations for FDI from non-EU investors is as follows: Germany (19%), the UK 
(15.4%), France (10.0%), Belgium (9.9%), and Italy (8.6). The most attractive countries to FDI in 
manufacturing are: Germany, (17.7%), the UK (9.7%), France (9.7%), Romania (8.2%) and Italy 
(7.7%). The top highest location probabilities for FDI in services are Germany (16.6%), the UK 
(11.9%), France (11.0%), Italy (8.5%), and Belgium (6.8%). 
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Table 8: Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates by EU 
investors in manufacturing and services, 2002-2013 
                         EU Investors   
Explanatory variables  Manufacturing  Services  
    
EATR 0.066 0.000  
 
(0.174) (0.063)  
Market size (GDP) 0.531*** 0.356***  
 
(0.050) (0.015)  
EU market potential   -0.333*** -0.278***  
 
(0.114) (0.037)  
GDP per capita -1.027*** -0.508***  
 
(0.091) (0.031)  
Trade costs- distance to home country   -0.644*** -0.634***  
 
(0.059) (0.022)  
Common language 0.373*** 0.259***  
 
(0.106) (0.035)  
Common border  0.545*** 0.522***  
 
(0.080) (0.029)  
R&D expenditure intensity   -0.610*** -0.203***  
 
(0.233) (0.076)  
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.174*** 0.039**  
 
(0.057) (0.019)  
Dissimilarity parameters  ( kτ ) 
 
   
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group 0.640*** 0.528***  
 
(0.122) (0.036)  
Core and Northern EU Group 0.658*** 0.734***  
 
(0.047) (0.018)  
Central and Eastern EU Group 0.863*** 0.669***  
 
(0.067) (0.024)  
Southern EU Group  0.469*** 0.459***  
 
(0.058) (0.021)  
  
   
Number of observations 30,144 208,884  
log likelihood -3273 -22983  
LR test for IIA ( kτ =1) 
 
χ2 (4) = 
67.30***   
 
χ2 (4) = 
326.98***   
  
Notes: Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,  *, 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. The 
country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.      
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Table 9:  Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates by non-EU 
investors in manufacturing and services, 2002-2013 
Explanatory variables                           Non-EU Investors  
 Manufacturing  Services 
   
EATR -0.600*** -0.868*** 
 
(0.206) (0.066) 
Market size (GDP) 0.473*** 0.392*** 
 
(0.075) (0.021) 
EU market potential  0.796*** 0.827*** 
 
(0.107) (0.037) 
GDP per capita -0.531*** 0.105* 
 
(0.114) (0.060) 
Trade costs- distance to home country   0.171 0.136*** 
 
(0.145) (0.048) 
Common language 0.661*** 0.395*** 
  (0.142) (0.042) 
Common border  0.361*** 0.771*** 
 
(0.127) (0.045) 
R&D expenditure intensity  -0.818*** -0.389*** 
 
(0.311) (0.103) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.291*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.073) (0.025) 
Dissimilarity parameters ( kτ ) 
  United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group 0.460*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.098) (0.021) 
Core and Northern EU Group 0.459*** 0.483*** 
 
(0.063) (0.019) 
Central and Eastern EU Group 0.612*** 0.573*** 
 
(0.107) (0.045) 
Southern EU Group  0.336*** 0.529*** 
 
(0.061) (0.027) 
   Number of observations 17,049 129,400 
log likelihood -1732 -12901 
LR test for IIA ( kτ =1) 
 
χ2 (4) =  
57.81***   
 
χ2 (4) =  
391.53***   
 
Notes: Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,  *, 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages. Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. The 
country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.      
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Table 10: Estimated location probabilities for EU countries  
Country All investors EU investors Non-EU investors Manufacturing Services 
Austria 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 1.9% 3.8% 
Belgium 6.3% 4.3% 9.9% 3.8% 6.8% 
Bulgaria 2.9% 3.8% 1.3% 5.0% 2.3% 
Czech Republic 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 3.6% 3.3% 
Germany 15.8% 13.5% 19.0% 17.7% 16.6% 
Denmark 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 0.7% 1.9% 
Estonia 0.7% 1.1% 0.3% 0.8% 0.7% 
Spain 3.9% 4.7% 3.0% 3.2% 3.6% 
Finland 2.3% 2.2% 1.9% 2.0% 2.3% 
France 10.6% 9.8% 10.0% 9.7% 11.0% 
Greece 1.5% 1.9% 1.5% 0.9% 1.3% 
Croatia 1.8% 2.1% 1.3% 2.3% 1.7% 
Hungary 2.7% 3.1% 2.0% 3.5% 2.6% 
Ireland 1.7% 1.5% 3.0% 1.2% 1.9% 
Italy 8.8% 9.2% 8.6% 7.7% 8.5% 
Lithuania 1.2% 1.7% 0.7% 1.6% 1.1% 
Luxembourg 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.1% 0.9% 
Latvia 1.2% 1.8% 0.6% 1.7% 1.0% 
Malta 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
Netherlands 4.4% 3.3% 6.7% 2.4% 5.2% 
Norway 1.1% 1.6% 0.4% 0.3% 1.3% 
Poland 7.6% 8.8% 4.7% 11.2% 6.4% 
Portugal  2.0% 2.6% 1.5% 1.2% 1.9% 
Romania 4.5% 6.3% 1.8% 8.2% 3.4% 
Slovenia 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.0% 1.2% 
Slovakia 2.8% 3.0% 2.6% 3.3% 2.7% 
United Kingdom 11.6% 9.1% 15.4% 9.7% 11.9% 
Notes: Estimates obtained from a nested logit model.  
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Given the focus of this paper on the role of corporate taxation on the location choice of FDI 
projects, Table 11 presents the implied elasticities of the country-specific location probabilities 
with respect to changes in the country-specific EATRs. 
As shown in Column 1, the highest sensitivity of EU countries’ attractiveness to FDI with 
respect to changes in the EATR is in Southern European countries while large countries appear 
to be the least sensitive. The implied elasticities of location probabilities range from -1.8 in Malta 
to -0.7 in the UK. Intra-EU investments appear not to be sensitive to changes in the EATR with 
the related elasticities close to zero. In contrast, the sensitivity of the location probabilities is the 
highest in the case of investments from outside the EU. Ireland has the highest sensitivity with 
an elasticity of -7.1 and the UK is the least sensitive with an elasticity of -3.2. In relation to FDI 
in manufacturing, the elasticity of the location probabilities with respect to the EATR ranges 
from -1.6 in Malta to -0.5 in Bulgaria.  
Relative to FDI in manufacturing, the sensitivity of the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI in 
services with respect to changes in the EATR is higher. The respective elasticities range from -
2.5 in Malta to 1.1 in the UK.     
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Table 11: Sensitivity of EU countries’ attractiveness to FDI to changes in their own 
EATR    
Country All FDI EU Investors 
Non-EU 
Investors Manufacturing Services 
Austria -1.0327 0.1989 -5.1564 -0.9428 -1.4964
Belgium -1.0284 0.2040 -4.7663 -0.9493 -1.4897
Bulgaria -0.8360 0.1540 -3.2431 -0.5064 -1.2138
Czech Republic -1.1121 0.2083 -4.1157 -0.6915 -1.5824
Germany -0.9141 0.1846 -4.1966 -0.7544 -1.3259
Denmark -1.0538 0.2026 -5.2567 -0.9546 -1.5281
Estonia -1.0994 0.2018 -4.1824 -0.6710 -1.5787
Spain -1.5115 0.2996 -4.9872 -1.3186 -2.1769
Finland -1.0553 0.2030 -5.2778 -0.9437 -1.5365
France -1.0159 0.1986 -5.0704 -0.9022 -1.4784
Greece -1.5716 0.3095 -4.9575 -1.4086 -2.2612
Croatia -1.0595 0.1958 -4.0231 -0.6499 -1.5211
Hungary -1.0823 0.2007 -4.0824 -0.6664 -1.5508
Ireland -1.2519 0.2193 -7.0903 -0.7485 -1.9028
Italy -1.1283 0.2372 -3.6304 -0.9601 -1.6103
Lithuania -1.0164 0.1867 -3.8691 -0.6206 -1.4610
Luxembourg -1.1010 0.2117 -5.4688 -0.9939 -1.5975
Latvia -0.9947 0.1824 -3.7994 -0.6069 -1.4315
Malta -1.7750 0.3510 -5.6091 -1.5732 -2.5411
Netherlands -1.0217 0.2000 -4.8554 -0.9383 -1.4738
Norway -1.0948 0.2087 -5.5006 -0.9920 -1.5891
Poland -0.9620 0.1807 -3.7436 -0.5960 -1.4076
Portugal  -1.5328 0.3040 -4.9062 -1.3793 -2.1943
Romania -0.9944 0.1817 -3.9471 -0.5971 -1.4600
Slovenia -1.1579 0.2139 -4.3314 -0.7093 -1.6541
Slovakia -1.0686 0.1991 -3.9525 -0.6597 -1.5315
United Kingdom -0.7303 0.1607 -3.1571 -0.5969 -1.0893
Notes: Elasticities of location probabilities are computed at the country-specific sample means. The 
elasticity of the location probability for country i with respect to changes in its EATR is 
obtained following Greene (2000) and Wen and Koppelman (2001):  
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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5 Conclusions  
The evidence in this paper indicates that on average, other things equal, lower corporate 
effective average tax rates increase the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI. When 
distinguishing between intra-EU FDI projects and those originating from outside the EU, our 
estimates show that the location choice of FDI projects by investors from outside the EU is 
highly sensitive to the EATRs in host countries while, over and above other factors, the EATR 
does not seem to matter for the location choice of intra-EU FDI projects.      
Our research also finds that investors respond differently to corporate taxation depending on 
whether they invest in manufacturing or services. While over and above other factors, the EATR 
does not appear to affect significantly the location choice of FDI in manufacturing, higher 
EATRs reduce the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI in services.   
In addition, a key finding of this paper is that the importance of the corporate taxation for the 
attractiveness of EU countries varies depending on the origin of investors and sector. While the 
effect of the EATR on the chance to attract FDI is sizeable in the case of FDI from outside the 
EU and in services, it does not seem to matter for intra-EU and for FDI in manufacturing. 
Furthermore, while the EATR has a sizeable impact on the location choice of FDI from non-EU 
countries in both manufacturing and services, it has a greater impact in the case of FDI in 
services.      
Taken together, our research results indicate that while the corporate taxation is an important 
determinant in attracting FDI to EU countries, other factors matter too. In particular, market 
size, market potential, production costs, geographic and cultural proximity, as well as research 
and innovation capacity are important determinants of the location choice of FDI.  
Our results highlight also different patterns with respect to determinants of the location choice 
of FDI projects by investors from EU countries and investors from outside the EU. While intra-
EU investors seem to be mainly efficiency seeking, investors from outside the EU are seeking 
access to the EU Single Market. Furthermore, while access to the EU Single Market does not 
seem to matter for FDI in manufacturing, it matters for FDI in services.  
In terms of the sensitivity of the attractiveness of EU countries to changes in country-specific 
EATRs, our estimates indicate that the most sensitive are Southern European countries (Malta, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain) and the least sensitive Germany and the UK. This pattern is similar in 
the case of investments in manufacturing and services while a different pattern emerges in the 
case of investments from outside the EU. Ireland appears to be the most sensitive to changes in 
its EATR in terms of FDI from outside the EU, followed by Malta, Norway, Luxembourg, and 
Finland. 
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Appendix A  Data Description  
Table A1:  Variables Definitions and Data Sources  
Variable   Definition  Data source 
Location choice  Binary variable equal to 1 if a 
foreign affiliate was established in 
host country, 0 otherwise 
Amadeus data set, Bureau 
van Dijk  
Effective average tax rate 
(EATR) 
The difference of the net present 
value of a profitable investment 
project in the absence of tax and 
the net present value of the same 
investment in the presence of tax. 
Spengel et al. (2014) 
Real GDP GDP in 2005 prices  The World Bank, 
Economy & Growth  
Indicators   
EU Single Market  (market 
potential) 
The sum of GDP in the host 
country and the inverse distance-
weighted GDP of all alternative 
locations in the European Union 
other than the host country.   
The World Bank, 
Economy & Growth 
Indicators, and CEPII    
GDP per capita  GDP in 2005 prices over midyear 
population in host country   
The World Bank, 
Economy & Growth 
Indicators   
Distance  Distance in km between the host 
and home country capital cities 
CEPII 
Common language  Binary variable equal to 1 if home 
and host countries have a 
common  official primary 
language, 0 otherwise  
CEPII 
Common border   Binary variable equal to 1 if home 
and host countries share a border, 
0 otherwise 
CEPII 
R&D expenditure intensity  Public and private R&D 
expenditure as per cent of GDP  
The World Bank, Science 
& Technology Indicators 
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Appendix B  Alternative Nested Structures  
Table B1:  Alternative Nested Structures Tested and Reason for Rejection  
Nest 
Version  
Nested Structure Reason for rejection  
 
A 
 
United Kingdom and Ireland 
Core EU Group: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands  
Central and Eastern European EU Group: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
Northern EU Group: Denmark, Finland, Norway 
Southern EU Group: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain  
 
Estimates were not consistent 
with the profit maximization 
requirements for all variables 
( kτ  > 1). 
B Northern EU Group: Denmark, Finland, Norway,  
United Kingdom, Ireland 
Core EU Group: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands  
Central and Eastern European EU Group: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
Southern EU Group: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain  
 
Estimates were not consistent 
with the profit maximization 
requirements for all variables 
( kτ  > 1).  
Two 
Nests  Advanced EU: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, Spain 
Central and Eastern European EU Group: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
Estimated log likelihood was 
lower than in the selected 
structure with four nests (the 
likelihood dominance 
criterion).  
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Appendix C  Estimates obtained with a conditional logit model (CLM) 
Table C1: Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates in EU 
countries, 2002-2013  
 
All FDI  EU Investors  Non-EU Investors  
Explanatory variables     
    EATR  -0.806*** -0.433*** -1.228*** 
 
(0.047) (0.062) (0.079) 
EU Single Market   0.281*** -0.121*** 1.058*** 
 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.065) 
Market size (GDP) 0.695*** 0.581*** 0.888*** 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.021) 
GDP per capita  -0.613*** -0.718*** -0.369*** 
 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.048) 
Trade costs -0.224*** -0.345*** 0.363*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.106) 
Common language 0.638*** 0.396*** 0.856*** 
 
(0.034) (0.047) (0.054) 
Common border  1.078*** 1.266*** 0.832*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.073) 
R&D expenditure intensity -0.677*** -0.543*** -1.095*** 
 
(0.093) (0.110) (0.175) 
R&D expenditure intensity  0.155*** 0.115*** 0.250*** 
squared (0.022) (0.026) (0.042) 
    Number observations 448,402 285,461 162,941 
Log likelihood -49934 -32303 -16831 
Notes: Estimates obtained with a conditional logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,  *, 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. 
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Table C2: Determinants of the location choice for new foreign affiliates in EU 
countries, 2002-2013, Manufacturing and Services   
 
All FDI EU Investors  Non-EU Investors  
Explanatory variables  Manuf. Services Manuf. Services Manuf. Services 
              
EATR  -0.599*** -0.864*** -0.168 -0.495*** -1.122*** -1.258*** 
 
(0.142) (0.051) (0.187) (0.069) (0.226) (0.084) 
EU Single Market   0.353*** 0.343*** 0.019 -0.073 0.912*** 1.116*** 
 
(0.101) (0.036) (0.124) (0.045) (0.202) (0.069) 
Market size (GDP) 0.801*** 0.665*** 0.680*** 0.555*** 0.990*** 0.842*** 
 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.039) (0.015) (0.057) (0.022) 
GDP per capita  -1.326*** -0.471*** -1.469*** -0.595*** -1.077*** -0.194*** 
 
(0.080) (0.028) (0.103) (0.035) (0.137) (0.053) 
Trade costs -0.202*** -0.215*** -0.342*** -0.335*** 0.280 0.317*** 
 
(0.047) (0.019) (0.046) (0.017) (0.304) (0.114) 
Common language 0.759*** 0.523*** 0.416*** 0.321*** 1.129*** 0.695*** 
 
(0.097) (0.037) (0.135) (0.053) (0.158) (0.058) 
Common border  0.945*** 1.153*** 1.182*** 1.306*** 0.391* 1.005*** 
 
(0.074) (0.030) (0.077) (0.031) (0.224) (0.078) 
R&D expenditure intensity -0.806*** -0.514*** -0.673* -0.333*** -1.199** -0.990*** 
 
(0.288) (0.106) (0.344) (0.125) (0.498) (0.201) 
R&D expenditure intensity  0.228*** 0.118*** 0.191** 0.069** 0.337*** 0.220*** 
squared (0.070) (0.025) (0.084) (0.030) (0.117) (0.048) 
       Number of observations 48,413 347,115 31,346 217,349 17,067 129,766 
Log likelihood -5281 -38394 -3426 -24440 -1766 -13375 
Notes: Estimates obtained with a conditional logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,  *, 
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was 
established over the period in the host country. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect 
to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in percentages.  Trade costs, common language, 
common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are in logarithms. 
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